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Abstract
Most security research focuses on the technical aspects of systems. We consider security from a user-centred
point of view. We focus on cognitive processes that inﬂuence security of information ﬂow from the user
to the computer system. For this, we extend our framework developed for the veriﬁcation of usability
properties. Finally, we consider small examples to illustrate the ideas and approach, and show how some
conﬁdentiality leaks, caused by a combination of an inappropriate design and certain aspects of human
cognition, can be detected within our framework.
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1 Introduction
There has been much research on security (conﬁdentiality) of information ﬂow (see
Sabelfeld and Myers’ overview [19]). The starting point is the assumption that com-
putation uses conﬁdential inputs. The goal is to ensure a noninterference policy [10],
which essentially means that no diﬀerence in outputs can be observed between two
computations that are diﬀerent only in their conﬁdential inputs. Various approaches
to this problem, such as access control [3] and static information-ﬂow control [9],
have been proposed, and formalisms and mechanisms developed, e.g. security-type
systems [20] and type-checkers [15].
All this research focuses on the technical aspects of software systems. It aims
at ensuring that the implementation of a system does not leak conﬁdential infor-
mation. However, technology is only one aspect of security. Within interactive
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Fig. 1. The cycle of interaction
systems, there is another actor besides a computer system – its human user. Even
perfectly designed and implemented systems cannot prevent users from unwittingly
compromising conﬁdential information they have. Users can breach security for
many reasons. Nevertheless, research in human-computer interaction [1,13] reveals
systematic causes of such violations, including cognitive overload, lack of security
knowledge, and mismatches between the behaviour of computer systems and the
mental model that their users have. Even in the absence of software errors security
can be breached when the functionally correct behaviour is inconsistent with user
expectations [13].
The relationship between users and security mechanisms is addressed by user-
centred security which provides “security models, mechanisms, systems, and soft-
ware that have usability as a primary motivation or goal” [21]. Much of this work
takes social dimensions, considering problems like user motivation and understand-
ing of security mechanisms, work practices, the relationships between system users,
including authorities and communities of users, and threats to security exploiting
social engineering techniques.
Our work lies between the technical aspects of information-ﬂow security and
the social aspects of user-centred security. More speciﬁcally, we are interested in
information ﬂow; however, the locus of this ﬂow is now not within a computer
system but within the inputs provided to it by its user. We are not considering the
social aspects of human-computer interaction and security. Instead, the focus of
our attention is cognitive processes that inﬂuence information ﬂow from the human
user into the computer system.
We build upon the generic user model (cognitive architecture) we developed in
our work on usability [8]. It was developed from abstract cognitive principles, such
as a user entering an interaction with knowledge of the task and its subsidiary goals.
The cognitive architecture was later extended [17] to include an abstract speciﬁca-
tion, interpretation, of the pathways from device signals and environment objects
to the user decision of what they mean (see Fig. 1). Incorporating such models of
user behaviour into models of security is advocated by user-centred security [21]:
e.g. Ka-Ping derives the guidelines (design rules) for secure interaction design from
an informal user model [13].
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Our cognitive architecture has proved of use for detecting various types of sys-
tematic user errors in the context of usability and task completion [8,17]. Here
our aim is to show that the behaviours emerging from this architecture also expose
security problems and so facilitate the improvement of security aspects in user in-
teraction design. To demonstrate this, we ﬁrst informally discuss, from a security
viewpoint, several examples of user error dealt with in our earlier work [8]. Then we
consider an example of using the model checking tool SAL [14] to detect some con-
ﬁdentiality leaks emerging from our cognitive architecture and conditioned by the
user interpretation of system prompts. More speciﬁcally, we consider security prob-
lems that may arise from the combination of user habits and (relative) positioning
of input ﬁelds in authentication interfaces. The examples are small and intended to
illustrate an approach and ideas that we believe are more generally applicable.
Summarising, the main contribution of this paper is the following:
• An investigation into the formal modelling of cognitive aspects of conﬁdentiality
leaks in interactive systems.
• An extension of our framework, developed for usability veriﬁcation, to deal with
the security problems in user interaction.
• An illustrative example of conﬁdentiality leaks, caused by cognitive interpretation
and detectable by model checking using our cognitive architecture.
Related work
Whilst conducted independently and in parallel, Beckert and Beuster’s work [2]
takes a similar approach to ours. They also develop a formal user model, and com-
bine it with speciﬁcations of the application and the user’s assumptions about that
application to verify security properties of interactive systems. Their user modelling
is based on the formalisation of an established methodology, GOMS [12], which is
the core of their work. The modelling of user’s assumptions partially coincides with
our user interpretation. However, their “assumptions” model user choice between
multiple plausible options, whereas our “interpretation” deals, in addition, with the
user perception of interface objects depending on their shape, position, etc. Beckert
and Beuster informally deﬁne three HCI security requirements, however, only one
is formalised, whereas correctness properties in our framework also address the re-
maining two. It is also unclear whether they provide tool support for automatic
veriﬁcation. On the other hand, their methodology supports hierarchical models:
an advantage when dealing with larger systems.
In the related area of safety-critical systems, Rushby et al [18] focus on mode
errors and the ability of pilots to track mode changes. They formalise plausible
mental models of systems and analyse them using the Murφ veriﬁcation tool. The
mental models though are essentially abstracted system models; they do not rely
upon structure provided by cognitive principles. Neither do they model user inter-
pretation. Cerone et al’s [7] CSP model of an air traﬃc control system includes
controller behaviour. A model checker was used to look for new behavioural pat-
terns, missed by the analysis of experimental data. The classiﬁcation stage in their
R. Rukše˙nas et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 183 (2007) 21–38 23
Table 1
A fragment of the SAL language
x:T x has type T
λ(x:T):e a function of x with the value e
x′ = e an update: the new value of x is that of the expression e
{x:T | p(x)} a subset of T such that the predicate p(x) holds
a[i] the i-th element of the array a
r.x the ﬁeld x of the record r
r WITH .x := e the record r with the ﬁeld x replaced by the value of e
g → upd if g is true then update according to upd
c [] d non-deterministic choice between c and d
[](i:T): ci non-deterministic choice between the ci with i in range T
model is similar to user interpretation.
Ka-Ping [13] gives a list of design rules, justiﬁed by an informal user model and
tailored to increase security of interactive systems. As the rules are informal (many
are probably too abstract to be formalised), there is no tool support for verifying
whether designs obey them.
2 The Cognitive Architecture in SAL
Our cognitive architecture is a higher-order logic formalisation of abstract princi-
ples of cognition and speciﬁes cognitively plausible behaviour [5]. The architecture
speciﬁes possible user behaviour (traces of actions) that can be justiﬁed in terms
of speciﬁc results from the cognitive sciences. Real users can act outside this be-
haviour, about which the architecture says nothing. Its predictive power is bounded
by the situations where people act according to the principles speciﬁed. The ar-
chitecture allows one to investigate what happens if a person acts in such plausible
ways. The behaviour deﬁned is neither “correct” nor “incorrect”. It could be either
depending on the environment and task in question. We do not attempt to model
the underlying neural architecture nor the higher level cognitive architecture such
as information processing. Instead our model is an abstract speciﬁcation, intended
for ease of reasoning.
We rely upon cognitive principles that give a knowledge level description in the
terms of Newell [16]. Their focus is on the goals and knowledge of a user. Our for-
malisation of the principles is based on the SAL model checking environment [14].
It provides a higher-order speciﬁcation language and tools for analysing state ma-
chines speciﬁed as parametrised modules and composed either synchronously or
asynchronously. The SAL notation we use is given in Table 1. We also use the usual
notation for the conjunction, disjunction and set membership operators. A slightly
simpliﬁed version of the SAL speciﬁcation of a transition relation that deﬁnes our
user model is given in Fig. 2, where predicates in italic are shorthands explained
later on. Below we discuss the cognitive principles and the way they are reﬂected
in the SAL speciﬁcation (module User).
Non-determinism. In any situation, any one of several cognitively plausi-
ble behaviours might be taken. It cannot be assumed that any speciﬁc plausible
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TRANSITION
[](i:GoalRange): GoalCommit:
gcommit[i] = ready ∧
NOT(gcomm ∨ rcomm) ∧
finished = notf ∧
goals[i].grd(in, mem, env)
→
gcommit′[i] = committed;
gcomm′ = TRUE
[]
[](i:ReactRange): ReactCommit:
rcommit[i] = ready ∧
NOT(gcomm ∨ rcomm) ∧
finished = notf ∧
react[i].grd(in, mem, env)
→
rcommit′[i] = committed;
rcomm′ = TRUE
[]
[](i:GoalRange): GoalTrans:
gcommit[i] = committed →
gcommit′[i] = done;
gcomm′ = FALSE
GoalTransition(i)
[]
[](i:ReactRange): ReactTrans:
rcommit[i] = committed →
rcommit′[i] = ready;
rcomm′ = FALSE
ReactTransition(i)
[]
Exit:
PerceivedGoal(in, mem) ∧
NOT(gcomm ∨ rcomm) ∧
finished = notf
→ finished′ = ok
[]
Abort:
NOT(EnabledGoals(in, mem, env)) ∧
NOT(EnabledReact(in, mem, env)) ∧
NOT(PerceivedGoal(in, mem)) ∧
NOT(gcomm ∨ rcomm) ∧
finished = notf
→
finished′ = IF Wait(in, mem)
THEN notf
ELSE abort ENDIF
[]
Idle:
finished = notf →
Fig. 2. User model in SAL (simpliﬁed)
behaviour will be the one that a person will follow. The SAL speciﬁcation is a
transition system. Non-determinism is represented by the non-deterministic choice,
[], between the named guarded commands (i.e. transitions). For example, Goal-
Commit in Fig. 2 is the name of a family of transitions indexed by i. Each guarded
command in the speciﬁcation describes an action that a user could plausibly make.
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Mental versus physical actions. A user commits to taking an action in a
way that cannot be revoked after a certain point. Once a signal has been sent from
the brain to the motor system to take an action, it cannot be stopped even if the
person becomes aware that it is wrong before the action is taken. Therefore, we
model both physical and mental actions. Each physical action modelled is associated
with an internal mental action that commits to taking it. In the speciﬁcation, this
is reﬂected by the pairings of guarded commands: GoalCommit – GoalTrans, and
ReactCommit – ReactTrans. The ﬁrst of the pair models committing to an action,
the second actually doing it (see below).
User goals. A user enters an interaction with knowledge of the task and, in par-
ticular, task dependent sub-goals that must be discharged. These sub-goals might
concern information that must be communicated to the device or items (such as
bank cards) that must be inserted into the device. Given the opportunity, people
may attempt to discharge such goals, even when the device is prompting for a diﬀer-
ent action. We model such knowledge as user goals which represent a pre-determined
partial plan that has arisen from knowledge of the task in hand, independent of the
environment in which that task is performed. No ﬁxed order is assumed over how
user goals will be discharged.
To see how this is modelled in SAL consider the guarded command GoalTrans
for doing a user action that has been previously committed to:
gcommit[i] = committed →
gcommit′[i] = done;
gcomm′ = FALSE;
GoalTransition(i)
The left-hand side of → is the guard of this command. It says that the rule will
only activate if the associated action has already been committed to, as indicated
by the i-th element of the local variable array gcommit holding value committed.
If the rule is then non-deterministically chosen to ﬁre, this value is changed to
done and the boolean variable gcomm is set to false to indicate there are now no
commitments to physical actions outstanding and the user model can select another
goal. GoalTransition(i) represents the state updates associated with this particular
action i.
User goals are modelled as an array, goals, which is a parameter of the User
module. The state space of the user model consists of three parts: input variable
in, output variable out, and global variable (memory) mem; the environment is
modelled by a global variable, env. All of these are speciﬁed using type variables
and are instantiated for each concrete interactive system. Each goal is speciﬁed
by a record with the ﬁelds grd, tout, tmem and tenv. The grd ﬁeld is discussed
below. The remaining ﬁelds are relations from old to new states that describe
how two components of the user model state (outputs out and memory mem) and
environment env are updated by discharging this goal. These relations, provided
when the generic user model is instantiated, are used to specify GoalTransition(i)
as follows:
out′ ∈ {x:Out | goals[i].tout(in,out,mem)(x)};
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mem′ ∈ {x:Memory | goals[i].tmem(in,mem,out′)(x)};
env′ ∈ {x:Env | goals[i].tenv(in,mem,env)(x) ∧ possessions}
Since we are modelling the cognitive aspects of user actions, all three updates
depend on the initial values of inputs (perceptions) and memory. In addition, each
update depends on the old value of the component updated. The memory update
also depends on the new value (out′) of the outputs, since we usually assume the
user remembers the actions just taken. The update of envmust also satisfy a generic
relation, possessions. It speciﬁes universal physical constraints on possessions and
their value, linking the events of taking and giving up a possession item with the
corresponding increase or decrease in the number (counter) of items possessed. For
example, it speciﬁes that if an item is not given up then the user still has it. The
counters of possession items are modelled as environment components. We omit
further details since, in this paper, possession properties are not used in any way.
If the guarded command for committing to a user goal, GoalCommit, ﬁres, it
switches the commit ﬂag for goal i to committed thus enabling the GoalTrans
command. The predicate grd, extracted from the goals parameter, speciﬁes when
there are opportunities to discharge this user goal. Because we assign done to the
corresponding element of the array gcommit in the GoalTrans command, once ﬁred
the command below will not execute again. If the user model discharges a goal, it
will not do so again without an additional reason such as a device prompt.
Reactive behaviour. Users may react to an external stimulus, doing the action
suggested by the stimulus. For example, if a ﬂashing light comes on a user might,
if the light is noticed, react by inserting coins in an adjacent slot. Reactive actions
are modelled by the pairing ReactCommit – ReactTrans in the same way as user
goals but on diﬀerent variables, e.g. parameter react of the User module rather
than goals. ReactTransition(i) is speciﬁed in the same way as GoalTransition(i).
The array element rcommit[i] is reassigned ready rather than done, once action
i has been executed, since reactive actions, if prompted, may be repeated.
Goal based task completion. Users intermittently, but persistently, termi-
nate interactions as soon as their main goal has been achieved [6], even if subsidiary
tasks generated in achieving the main goal have not been completed. A cash-point
example is a person walking away with the cash but leaving the card. In the SAL
speciﬁcation, a condition that the user perceives as the main goal of the interaction
is represented by a parameter PerceivedGoal of the User module. Goal based
completion is then modelled as the guarded command Exit, which simply states
that, once the predicate PerceivedGoal becomes true and there are no commit-
ments to user goals and/or reactive actions, the user may complete the interaction.
This action may still not be taken because the choice between enabled guarded
commands is non-deterministic. Task completion is modelled by setting the local
variable finished to ok, whereas the value notf means that the task is unﬁnished.
No-option based task termination. If there is no apparent action that a
person can take that will help complete the task then the person may terminate the
interaction. For example, if, on a ticket machine, the user wishes to buy a weekly
season ticket, but the options presented include nothing about season tickets, then
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the person might give up, assuming the goal is not achievable.
In the guarded command Abort, the no-option condition is expressed as the
negation of predicates EnabledGoals and EnabledReact. Note that, in such a case,
a possible action that a person could take is to wait. However, they will only do so
given some cognitively plausible reason such as a displayed “please wait” message.
The waiting conditions are represented in the speciﬁcation by predicate parameter
Wait. If Wait is false, finished is set to abort to model a user giving up and
terminating the task.
3 Veriﬁcation of Security Aspects in User Interaction
In this section, we discuss examples of user error, focussing on the security aspects
of interaction. We ﬁrst introduce the properties to verify.
3.1 Correctness properties: usability and security
Previously, our approach dealt with two kinds of usability properties. First, we
want to be sure that, in any possible system behaviour, the user’s main goal of
interaction (as they perceive it) is eventually achieved. Given our model’s state
space, this is written as the SAL assertion
F(PerceivedGoal(in, mem))(1)
where F means ‘eventually’. Second, in achieving a goal, subsidiary tasks are often
generated that the user must complete to complete the task associated with their
main goal. If the completion of the subsidiary tasks is represented as a predicate,
SecondaryGoal, the required condition is (where G means ‘always’):
G(PerceivedGoal(in, mem)⇒ F(SecondaryGoal(in, mem, env)))(2)
This states that the secondary goal is always eventually achieved once the perceived
goal has been. Often secondary goals can be expressed as interaction invariants [8]
which state that some property of the system state, that was perturbed to achieve
the main goal, is restored. Previously, we viewed property (2) in terms of pure
usability, applying it to, e.g. user possessions.
The veriﬁcation of (2) can, however, also be used to detect security problems.
Moreover, we will introduce a third kind of correctness property, relevant to conﬁ-
dentiality leaks in user input. Intuitively, one would like to prevent such leaks in all
system states, so we are aiming at a safety property. In terms of information-ﬂow
security [19], let us have, for simplicity, two conﬁdentiality levels of user inputs,
“high” and “low”. A safety property that addresses some security aspects is that
in no states do high inputs appear on a low channel. A boolean, SecurityBreach,
represents system states that breach this. The property, stating that it is always
true there is no security breach, is then:
G(NOT(SecurityBreach))(3)
We discuss how SecurityBreach is set to true, indicating breaches, in Section 4.
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Note that neither of the ﬁrst two correctness properties capture conﬁdentiality
leaks modelled as SecurityBreach. Property (1) is a usability property; the essen-
tial condition is a user achieving the main goal. The fact that this goal might be
achieved by ﬁrst making a mistake then undoing the erroneous action is irrelevant.
However, with respect to security, undo is not good enough [13]: an erroneous action
could already have leaked conﬁdential information. Though checking property (2)
can reveal some security problems related to, e.g. post-completion errors (see be-
low), it is still a liveness property. As such, it does not require a system to satisfy
the condition SecondaryGoal in all states, only at some point after the main goal
has been achieved.
3.2 User error and security
Erroneous actions are the proximate cause of failure, since it was a particular ac-
tion that caused the problem: e.g. a user entering data in the wrong ﬁeld. To
eliminate the problem, however, one must consider the ultimate causes of an er-
ror. In our framework, we consider situations where the ultimate causes are aspects
(limitations) of human cognition that have not been addressed in the interface. An
example is that a person enters data in a particular ﬁeld because the interface design
suggests it as appropriate for that data. In Hollnagel’s terms [11] which distinguish
between human error phenotypes (classes of erroneous actions) and genotypes (the
underlying, e.g. psychological, cause), our cognitive architecture deals with geno-
types. Since there is no evidence that security errors are conditioned by diﬀerent
cognitive causes to usability errors, our cognitive architecture can exhibit behaviours
leading to security problems, even though it was developed without security con-
cerns in mind. Some of these errors have the same cognitive causes as the usability
errors we dealt with in our earlier work [8]. Next we discuss several types of user
error, related to security but still detectable within the usability based approach
represented by properties (1) and (2).
A persistent user error that emerges from the cognitive architecture is the post-
completion error [6], where a user terminates an interaction with completion of
subsidiary tasks outstanding. People have been found to make such errors even in
lab conditions [6]. An example of this error, which is also a security breach, is when,
with old cash machines, users persistently took cash but left their bank card. Within
our cognitive architecture, such behaviour emerges because of an action (Exit) that
allows a user to stop once the goal has been achieved. Using our veriﬁcation frame-
work, this is detected by checking property (2). For this, SecondaryGoal would
state that the total value of user possessions (bank cards included) in a state is the
same as it was before the interaction. The formal veriﬁcation of a similar example
is described in [8].
Blandford and Rugg [4] give an example of an extant security breach caused by
users forgetting to log out when moving away from an industrial printer, leaving it
vulnerable to sabotage – e.g. by unauthorised users changing the printed message,
etc. Being a case of the post-completion error, it can be detected by verifying
property (2) with the appropriately chosen SecondaryGoal.
R. Rukše˙nas et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 183 (2007) 21–38 29
Enter
User Name: Password:
Enter
User Name:
Password:
Fig. 3. Two layouts of an authentication interface
Previously [17] we also considered user error due to the shape-induced confusion
over the meaning of interface prompts. The example was that of a user attempting
to top-up a phone card using an ATM. We showed how model checking, based on
our cognitive architecture, can identify user confusion as to which of two numbers,
phone number or top-up card number, is requested. The property checked was of
type (1), i.e. whether the user achieves the main goal. User confusion in a similar
situation can also result in conﬁdentiality leaks. For example, asked to enter a card
number, a person might be confused whether the number requested is that of a
bank card or a phone card. If a bank card number is entered when the interface
prompts for a top-up card number, the input might be displayed which is a security
breach. This problem would also be detected by analysing why the user could not
achieve the main goal.
4 A Case Study: Authentication Interface
In this section, we extend our previous work and investigate how other security
problems, not considered in that work, can be detected using our cognitive archi-
tecture formalised in SAL. In particular, we show how user habits in combination
with some designs, can lead to the incorrect interpretation of interface prompts,
resulting in the leakage of conﬁdential information. To determine whether such
leakages are possible, we introduce into our framework a new entity, generic module
tester. This module is instantiated by providing a collection of channels and a
high security value. The instantiated module then checks whether this value can
appear on one of the low security channels.
4.1 An Authentication Interface
Our example concerns an authentication step present in various everyday interactive
systems, e.g. internet banking. Before any transaction, users must establish their
identities by providing a user name and a login password. The system checks
whether the provided password is the same as the one associated with the provided
user name and stored in the system’s database. On the surface, one could expect the
design of an authentication interface to be simple, e.g. like the one in Fig. 3(left).
In reality, the situation is more complicated. The sizes of interface windows in
internet banking systems are not ﬁxed; users might change them at any time. This
means that the layout of input ﬁelds is determined by an algorithm. Depending on
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INIT LOGIN
INCORRECT STOPWARNING
IncorrectMsg
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(¬CorrectInput)
Acknowledged EnterPressed
EnterPressed
(IncorrectData)displayed
DisplayedEnter
IncompleteMsg
Fig. 4. Authentication procedure
this algorithm, the layout shown in Fig. 3(right) is possible when the window size is
reduced. We will argue that the two interfaces are not equally secure and will show
how conﬁdentiality leaks in the second one can be detected using our veriﬁcation
framework.
We assume that a high security channel is associated with login passwords and a
low security channel with user names. This could mean, e.g., that the text entered
into the name box is echoed on the screen whereas an entry into the password box is
hidden. The data is sent whenever the users press the Enter button. The operation
of the authentication mechanism is illustrated by a ﬁnite state machine in Fig. 4
(false outputs are omitted). We distinguish two cases of incorrect input represented
by the transitions IncompleteData and IncorrectData. The authentication procedure
moves into the INCOMPLETE state when Enter is pressed and either a user name or a
password is missing from the input boxes. An appropriate error message is displayed
by the interface, and no other options for the user are given until the message is
acknowledged. Once the user acknowledges it, the authentication procedure returns
to the INIT state. The transition IncorrectData represents the case when both a
user name and a password are provided but some of this data is incorrect. Upon
acknowledgment, the procedure moves into the WARNING state in this case. The idea
is that, for security reasons, a single authentication attempt with incorrect data is
allowed before the authentication procedure aborts the interaction (STOP state).
Finally, authentication succeeds if the user provides correct data, represented by
the LOGIN state reachable from either the INIT or WARNING state.
The SAL speciﬁcation of the authentication procedure is a direct translation of
the diagram in Fig. 4. The type Inbox = {A, B} represents the two input boxes.
Each box has a number of attributes: position, security level, “visibility”, label,
text entered and text displayed, modelled as arrays with the range Inbox. Thus,
position[j] is a record with the coordinate ﬁelds x and y, denoting the top-
left corner of box j. Its width and height are represented by the constants dx
and dy. The attribute level[j] is the security level of j which is either Low or
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High; displayed[j] indicates whether j is displayed (visible) or not. The attribute
label[j] is a value of type {NameLabel,PasswordLabel}. Finally, value[j] and
display[j] represent, respectively, text entered and text displayed, which can diﬀer
when the entered text is hidden. The array value and booleans EnterPressed and
Acknowledged are the inputs of the authentication procedure, whereas position,
displayed, label, and display with booleans DisplayedEnter, IncompleteMsg,
IncorrectMsg, LastAttemptMsg, LoginMsg, and AbortMsg are its outputs.
4.2 A User Model
Now we instantiate the generic module User for the authentication task. We start
by specifying the state space of the concrete user model. For each input box j, we
assume that a person either sees it or not, and perceives its label and the text dis-
played, represented by seen[j], label[j] and value[j], respectively. The percep-
tion of whether the Enter button is active is denoted by EnterActive. The person
also perceives whether an error, warning or authentication message is given, denoted
by ErrorMsg, WarningMsg and LoginMsg. Variables InputName and InputPass de-
note the perception of which of the two boxes prompts for the user name and which
for the password. Finally, name and password denote the values the person per-
ceives as a user name and password. All these components form a record type, In,
which is used to instantiate the corresponding type variable in User.
Next, we specify variables related to the actions users might take. The text
typed into box j is represented by value[j]. The booleans EnterPressed and
Acknowledged denote whether the Enter button and a button to acknowledge mes-
sages are pressed. These components form a record type, Out. We assume users
remember their user name, name, and login password, password. They also remem-
ber whether they already typed information into box j, denoted entered[j] (reset
to false when an error message is acknowledged), and keep track of whether there
was a failure to authenticate, denoted failed. These form a record type, Mem, which
also records, in a component of the type Out, the actions taken in the previous step.
The reality surrounding our system is given by a record type, Env. It includes the
user name, name, and the correct password, password.
We assume that user knowledge of authentication includes the need to communi-
cate (1) user name and (2) login password. This knowledge is speciﬁed as user goals
(elements of array goals) instantiated by giving the action guard and the updates
to the output component. For the goal of communicating the user name, the guard
is that an input box, regarded as the name box, is seen. The output action is to
enter the name as the user perceives it:
grd := λ(in,mem,env): in.seen[in.InputName]
tout := λ(in,out0,mem):λ(out): out = Default(out0.value)
WITH .value[in.InputName] := in.name
where Default(x) is a record with the ﬁeld value set to x and all other ﬁelds set to
false thus asserting that nothing else is done. The memory update (omitted) simply
records the action taken. As an example, we will specify the most complicated
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memory update below. The action of communicating the login password is speciﬁed
similarly. Since the environment updates change nothing (in all the actions), they
are omitted here.
We assume that the user can react to the active Enter button by pressing it. For
this to happen, the user must not have the recollection of a failure to authenticate.
Alternatively, if there was such a failure, we expect the user to be more careful and
press Enter only when both input boxes were ﬁlled in:
grd := λ(in,mem,env): in.EnterActive ∧ (NOT(mem.failed) ∨
(mem.entered[in.InputName] ∧ mem.entered[in.InputPass]))
tout := λ(in,out0,mem):λ(out):
out = Default(out0.value) WITH .EnterPressed := TRUE
We also assume that the user can acknowledge error messages. This only happens
when the message is interpreted as an error signal. The acknowledgment must
also not have occurred, as indicated by the memory, in the previous step. By
acknowledging the error message, the user records in the memory the fact of a
failed authentication attempt, and “forgets” previously typing data into the input
boxes (since the data was rejected), formally speciﬁed as:
grd := λ(in,mem,env): in.ErrorMsg ∧ NOT(mem.out.Acknowledged)
tout := λ(in,out0,mem):λ(out):
out = Default(out0.value) WITH .Acknowledged := TRUE
tmem := λ(in,mem0,out):λ(mem): mem = mem0 WITH .failed := TRUE
WITH .entered := [[j:Inbox] FALSE] WITH .out := out
As discussed earlier, the need to communicate the name and password is mod-
elled as user goals. However, it is plausible that the user makes an error when
trying to achieve those goals, e.g., enters a wrong password or presses Enter when
some box is empty. Errors can also occur due to user habits; relying on previous
experience, the user might expect the input box for the name to precede that for the
password. In such cases, once the error message has been acknowledged, the system
prompts for a new authentication attempt. We assume that the user will respond
to this prompt. The response is modelled as two reactive actions. In the case of the
password, the action guard is that an input box is seen (as for the corresponding
user goal) and the password was not entered, as indicated by the memory, in the
previous step. The output action is the same as for the corresponding user goal.
Finally, the memory update records the fact of entering the password:
grd := λ(in,mem,env): in.seen[in.InputPass] ∧
NOT(mem.entered[in.InputPass]) ∧ mem.failed
tout := λ(in,out0,mem):λ(out): out = Default(out0.value)
WITH .value[in.InputPass] := in.password
tmem := λ(in,mem0,out):λ(mem): mem = mem0
WITH .entered[in.InputPass] := TRUE WITH .out := out
The reactive action for entering the name is analogous to the one above.
Goal and wait predicates are the last parameters used to instantiate the User
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module. The display of LoginMsg conﬁrms authentication which is the main goal.
We also assume that there are no signals that a user would perceive as a suggestion
to wait. These predicates are speciﬁed as follows:
PerceivedGoal = λ(in,mem): in.LoginMsg
Wait = λ(in,mem): FALSE
Finally, the user model for the authentication task, UserAuthenticate, is de-
ﬁned by instantiating the generic user model with the parameters (goals, reactive
actions, perceived goal and wait condition) just deﬁned.
4.3 User Interpretation
So far we have speciﬁed an authentication interface and have developed a formal
model of its user. As in reality, the state spaces of the two speciﬁcations are distinct.
The changing interface state is ﬁrst attended to then interpreted by the user. Next
we specify this interpretation, thus connecting distinct state spaces. The speci-
ﬁcation is given as a new SAL module, interpretation. The module, being a
connector, has input variables that are the output variables of the interface, and an
output variable that is the input (perception) component of the UserAuthenticate
module (record in).
In the authentication task, the crucial aspect of user interpretation is the percep-
tion of the meaning (function) of the two input boxes. Their function is indicated
by labels, however, we assume that people may not pay suﬃcient attention to the
labels. Instead, the user might assume the name box comes ﬁrst. The perception
of precedence depends on the layout (coordinates) of boxes in the interface window.
Formally, we deﬁne the condition when the input box i precedes j as follows (here
pos is an array of coordinates):
precedes(i,j,pos) = (pos[i].x + dx < pos[j].x ∧ pos[i].y ≤ pos[j].y)
∨ (pos[i].x ≤ pos[j].x ∧ pos[i].y + dy < pos[j].y)
Intuitively, this means that j is placed to the right and to the bottom of i. Thus,
the name box in the left interface in Fig. 3 precedes the password box, whereas
neither of the boxes in the interface on the right precedes the other.
Now we formally deﬁne the user interpretation of the function of input boxes,
depending on their layout and labelling. We distinguish three cases. First, the user
might judge the function of input boxes from their labels:
ByLabel(l,x) = ∃(i,j): l[i] = NameLabel ∧ l[j] = PasswordLabel ∧
x.InputName = i ∧ x.InputPass = j
Second, if i precedes j then i is perceived as a name and j as password box:
ByPrecedence(pos,x) = ∃(i,j): precedes(i,j,pos) ∧
x.InputName = i ∧ x.InputPass = j
Finally, the user might get confused. This is possible when neither of the input
boxes precedes the other or their labels are the same; the judgment about the
function of the boxes is random in this case:
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DEFINITION in ∈ { x:In |
IF NOT(gcomm ∨ rcomm) THEN
x.EnterActive = DisplayedEnter ∧
x.seen = displayed ∧ x.label = label ∧ x.value = display ∧
x.ErrorMsg = (IncompleteMsg ∨ IncorrectMsg) ∧
x.WarningMsg = LastAttemptMsg ∧ x.LoginMsg = LoginMsg ∧
x.name = IF x.WarningMsg THEN env.name ELSIF mem.name ENDIF ∧
x.password = IF x.WarningMsg THEN env.password
ELSIF mem.password ENDIF ∧
IF x.WarningMsg THEN ByLabel(label,x)
ELSIF MajorChanges(p,position,l,label) THEN ByLabel(label,x)
∨ ByPrecedence(position,x) ∨ Random(position,label,x)
ELSE x.InputName = s.InputName ∧ x.InputPass = s.InputPass ENDIF
ELSE x = s ENDIF }
TRANSITION
s′ = in; p′ = position; l′ = label
Fig. 5. User interpretation in SAL
Random(pos,l,x) = (l[A] = l[B] ∨ ∀(i,j):NOT(precedes(i,j,pos))) ∧
x.InputName 
= x.InputPass
User interpretation is modelled as a SAL deﬁnition which allows one to describe
system invariants. Intuitively, this means that the left-hand side of an equation is
updated whenever the value of the right-hand side changes. We assume that, once
the user makes a mental commitment to a goal or reactive action, the interpretation
of the interface outputs does not change until the associated physical action is
performed. If there is no commitment, the user directly perceives the Enter button,
the displayed input boxes with their labels and displayed text, and the interface
messages. Hence the ﬁrst seven conjuncts in Fig. 5 simply rename the interface
variables to the corresponding ﬁelds of the record in.
For the user name and password, the user relies on the memory unless a warning
message is displayed. If so, we expect the user to be careful enough to provide
the correct values. For simplicity, here we do not consider how this is actually
achieved (perhaps they are taken from a notebook), assuming that the values from
the environment speciﬁcation are used.
As explained earlier, the perception of which of the two boxes is for the names
and which for the passwords is more complicated; the results of this perception
are assigned to InputName and InputLabel, respectively. We assume that, upon
receiving a warning message, the user becomes more careful and interprets the input
boxes by their labels. Otherwise, if there are major changes in the layout of the
boxes, the interpretation is an arbitrary choice between the three cases deﬁned
above. If there are no major changes, the interpretation of the boxes is the same as
in the previous step. The auxiliary variables s, p and l are not intended to represent
aspects of cognition. Intuitively, they, and the related TRANSITION section, are used
to store the previous interpretation which allows specifying that user interpretation
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does not change. Finally, “major” changes mean changes in the precedence of input
boxes or any label change:
MajorChanges(pos0,pos,l0,l) =
∃(i,j): precedes(i,j,pos0) 
= precedes(i,j,pos) ∨ l0[i] 
= l[i]
Admittedly, this attempt to formally specify how the user perceives input boxes
already hints at potential problems, even before the actual veriﬁcation. However,
we aim at developing a generic model of interpretation which would turn the spec-
iﬁcation process into a simple instantiation of the generic model.
4.4 Veriﬁcation
We have speciﬁed an authentication interface and its user model. Now the cor-
rectness properties of this interactive system can be analysed. We start from the
interface with no constraints on the layout of the input boxes (other than that they
do not intersect). The usability property (1), the user eventually achieving the per-
ceived goal, is satisﬁed by the interactive system. Next we proceed with the analysis
of security aspects of the system.
Even though security properties for each concrete system can be speciﬁed sepa-
rately, we prefer to take a generic approach as with the user model itself. We thus
introduce a generic module, tester. The idea is that the module, composed with an
interactive system, monitors the communication between the device and the user.
When security is breached, it sets the variable SecurityBreach to true. What secu-
rity aspects are monitored is determined by the instantiation of the module. It has
three parameters. The type variable Chan represents the communication channels.
The predicate filter speciﬁes which of the channels are monitored. Finally, test
denotes security sensitive data. When this data appears on a monitored channel,
SecurityBreach is set to true. The transitions of the module are the following
family of commands:
[](j:Chan): filter(j) ∧ value[j] = test → SecurityBreach′ = TRUE
For our authentication task, Chan is instantiated to the input boxes (type Inbox).
The security sensitive data is the actual user password env.password. Finally, the
channels monitored are low security channels:
filter(j) = (level[j] = Low)
With this instantiation of tester, we check property (3); the veriﬁcation fails. The
counterexample produced by SAL indicates that the user enters the password into
the name box. The analysis of the speciﬁcations reveals that this counterexample
occurs because neither of the boxes precedes the other which confuses the user.
Why was this confusion not detected when verifying property (1)? The answer
is that it does not prevent the user from achieving the main goal, authenticating
their identity. Our user model is “smart” enough to recover from the mistake
made due to this confusion and, after receiving a warning message, to provide the
required information according to the labels of the input boxes. Such a recovery,
however, is not good enough from the security point of view, since the mistake could
R. Rukše˙nas et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 183 (2007) 21–3836
have already breached security and undoing or redoing a wrong action cannot undo
the consequences of this breach in most cases, which is detected by the failure to
establish property (3).
How can we avoid this security breach? Since the confusion leading to it is
caused by the layout of the input boxes, the solution is to display them as in
Fig. 3(left). However, one must be careful even with such a layout. If the password
box preceded the name box, people might enter their password into the name box,
due to their habits rather than confusion. Again, this security breach was detected
by verifying (3). The latter holds only when the layout of the input boxes is such
that precedes(InputName,InputPass,position) is true.
5 Conclusion
In previous work, we assumed that usability veriﬁcation is enough to establish
user-centred correctness of interactive systems. This is not true within security- or
mission-critical contexts where it is possible to achieve the main goal while expos-
ing ourselves to various security or safety risks. Here we addressed one aspect of
interactive systems security – information-ﬂow security. We discussed how security
breaches can be detected using our earlier framework. The main focus, however,
was an extension of that framework to address security aspects more directly and
link them to the usability properties. For this, we introduced into our framework
a generic tester module which monitors information ﬂow between the user and the
device and registers security breaches in it. Using the tester, we added to our ver-
iﬁcation approach a correctness property which captures some security aspects of
interactive systems.
To illustrate these extensions, we considered a simple authentication interface.
We showed 4 how the layout of input ﬁelds combined with user habits can inﬂuence
the user (mis)interpretation of interface prompts, possibly leading to conﬁdentiality
leaks. We demonstrated how these leaks are detected using the SAL veriﬁcation
tools, and how the analysis of the SAL counterexamples can help in eradicating
cognitively susceptible interface designs. The SAL environment was primarily cho-
sen because of its support for higher-order speciﬁcations. This is necessary for
developing a generic cognitive architecture as ours.
The user interpretation stage was introduced into our framework from general
considerations. We previously showed how modelling user interpretation allows
us to detect usability problems due to the shape-induced confusion over device
prompts [17]. Here we showed that similar ideas apply in the context of security
properties and their dependence on the layout of input ﬁelds. Finally, we also
considered user habits, which we had not dealt with before.
Human factors in the security context have been considered before [1,13]. The
novelty of our approach is dealing with the cognitive aspects of security in a com-
pletely formal way, making them amenable to automatic veriﬁcation. Moreover, our
4 See our SAL speciﬁcations at http://www.dcs.qmul.ac.uk/∼rimvydas/usermodel/fmis06.zip .
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cognitive architecture could be used to prove generic results on, e.g., design rules
for security, using its formalisation within the HOL prover.
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